We study an affiliated value second price auction with two financially constrained bidders.
between standard IPV auctions no longer hold once financial constraints are introduced. The IPV setting, however, precludes one from analyzing how bidding constraints interact with information revelation in auctions. Che and Gale (1996b) consider a model in which bidders have identical common valuation of the object but have independent and privately observed bidding constraints.
Their focus is to show that in the presence of budget constraints standard auctions are not revenue equivalent and may be dominated by lottery and all-pay auction. Again the setting of known common valuation prevents them from studying the interaction between the budget constraints and the information revelation and the winner's curse. Benoît and Krishna (2000) study the auctions of multiple objects with financially constrained bidders under complete information. They focus on how the optimal orders of sale depends on the bidding constraints and on whether the multiple objects are complements or substitutes. Maskin (2000) studies the constrained efficient auction mechanism with liquidity constrained buyers in an IPV setting. Zheng (2000) provides a complete solution for first price IPV auctions with financially constrained bidders that allows for costly outside financing and bankruptcy.
In this paper we introduce bidders' financial constraints in a two-bidder version of Milgrom and Weber's (1982) general affiliated value auction model. Each bidder privately observes a signal about the value of the object, and is privately informed of the available budget in the auction. We establish, under quite general conditions, the existence of a symmetric equilibrium for the second price auction (SPA). It is shown that, with financially constrained bidders, the budget constraints and the signals closely interact in the equilibrium conditions of the SPA. The symmetric equilibrium we identify takes the following form: a bidder with a bidding budget w and a private signal x will bid min {w, b (x)} where b (·) , called the "unconstrained" bidding function, is an increasing function in x. In words, b (x) is the amount that an unconstrained bidder will bid in equilibrium, knowing that her opponent may be constrained and may think that she is constrained, and so on. It is shown that the unconstrained bidders are more aggressive in the presence of financial constraints in environments with strictly affiliated values than with private values. The intuition is simple: The likelihood that one's opponent may be financially constrained entails the possibility that a bidder wins the object even though her opponent has a higher signal, and this attenuates the winners' curse and makes a bidder more aggressive.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 derives the ordinary differential equation which has to be satisfied in equilibrium by the "unconstrained" bidding function. Section 4 proves, under quite general conditions, the existence of a symmetric equilibrium. Section 5 presents the comparative statics of the "unconstrained" bidding function with respect to public signals and the severity of the bidding constraints. Finally, Section
The Model
The main text of this paper studies the two bidder case, but we will here present the model of an arbitrary n ≥ 2 risk neutral bidders who compete for a single object in a SPA. Each bidder possesses some information concerning the value of the object for sale: let X i be the real-valued information variable (or value estimate, or signal) observed by bidder i. Let X = (X 0 , X 1 , ..., X n ) be a vector of information variables observed by all bidders. Let S = (S 1 , ..., S m ) be a vector of additional real-valued variables which influence the value of the object to the bidders. Some of the components of S might be observed by the seller. Let f (s, x) denote the joint probability density of the signals and F be the corresponding cumulative distribution function.
The actual value of the object to bidder i depends on all the information variables, and is denoted by V i = u i (S, X i , X −i ). The following assumptions from Milgrom and Weber (1982) are maintained:
Assumption 2: The function u is non-negative, is continuous and non-decreasing in its variables.
Assumption 3: f is symmetric in its last n arguments.
Assumption 4:
The variables S 1 , ..., S m , X 1 , ..., X n are affiliated.
Now we add to the above Milgrom and Weber's (1982) model the following feature: we assume that each bidder i gets an independent random draw W i from a common distribution G, which represents her available bidding budget. The corresponding density is denoted by g. We assume that g (·) is strictly positive on the support of W i . Let W = (W 1 , . . . , W n ) be the random vector of bidding budgets for the n bidders. The following assumptions are maintained:
Assumption 5: For each i, W i is independent of (S, X, W −i ).
, and for k = 1, ..., m,
The bounded support assumption on X i and S k , together with assumption 2 implies that for each i, E [V i ] is finite.
Assumption 7:w > u (s,x,x, ...,x) > w. This assumption implies that, first, with probability one a bidder with budgetw is not constrained; second, ex ante there is a positive probability that any bidder will be financially constrained.
Deriving the First Order Condition
We will analyze the equilibrium for the case n = 2. We will focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which bidding function takes the form that for each i = 1, 2,
where b (·) is a strictly increasing and piecewise differentiable function. We can think of b (x i ) as the bid of bidder i who has a signal x i , who is not herself financially constrained but understands that her opponents may be constrained, and so on. We will refer to b (·) as the "unconstrained" bidding function. For expositional ease we will refer to bidder 1 as "she" and bidder 2 as "he".
Suppose bidder 2 follows the bidding rule B (·, ·) as in (1), and consider the optimal strategy for bidder 1 who has a budgetw and a signal x 1 . By assumption 7, bidder 1 will not herself be financially constrained, but she understands that her opponent may be constrained and may expect her to be constrained with positive probability, and so on.
To analyze bidder 1's best response, we write Q (w 2 , x 2 , b) and P (w 2 , x 2 , b) as, respectively, bidder 1's probability of winning the object and her expected payment, if she bids b and if bidder 2 is of type (w 2 , x 2 ) and is following the bidding strategy (1) . By the rules of SPA, Q (w 2 , x 2 , b) and P (w 2 , x 2 , b) can be respectively expressed as
By assumption 7, a type-(w, x 1 ) bidder 1 will be unconstrained and hence she solves the following problem:
To furthermore analyze (4), it is useful to define the "generalized inverse" of b (·), which we denote by ψ :
Event II Event I Figure 1 : The two events in which bidder 1 wins the object with a bid b: Event I:
It is clear that if b (·) is everywhere continuous then we will simply have ψ (z) = b −1 (z) , which follows directly from the assumed strict monotonicity of b (·).
Using (2) and (3), we can rewrite bidder 1's objective function (4) as:
The right hand side of (6) is the sum of bidder 1's expected surplus under the two events when her bid b wins the object (see Figure 1 for a graphical illustration.) The first term is her expected surplus in Event I, when she wins the object and pays bidder 2's bid which is b (x 2 ) . Note that in this event, conditional on 2's signal x 2 , the probability that w 2 is higher than
second term is her expected surplus in the Event II, when she wins the object and pays bidder 2's bid which is w 2 . Notice that in this event, bidder 1 can only infer from her winning the object that
, which, conditional on her own signal, occurs with probability 1 − F X 2 |X 1 (ψ (w 2 ) |x 1 ) .
Before we proceed, we introduce the following notation that eases exposition:
. Table 1 : Notations.
The interpretation of the above four terms are as follows. ν (x, z) is the expected valuation of the object to bidder i when i and j's (j 6 = i) signals are respectively x and z. ϕ (x, z) is the expected valuation of the object to bidder i when i's signal is x and j's (j 6 = i) signal is at least z. λ (z|x) is the hazard function of j's signal conditional on i's signal x. Finally, γ (w) is the hazard function of the budget constraint distribution.
Now we can differentiate Π (b; x 1 ) with respect to b and applying Leibniz's rule, we get, after some simplification,
It turns out that it is easier to verify the second order condition if we interpret the auction as a revelation mechanism: each bidder i = 1, 2 reports his/her type to an mediator who will submit a bid for i according to (1) . Assume truth-telling by bidder 2. Then the expected payoff for bidder 1 of type (w, x 1 ) if she reports z, assuming that she reports her budget type truthfully (this is verified in the proof of Theorem 1), is given by Π (b (z) ; x 1 ) because the mediator will bid b (z) for her.
The first order condition for truth-telling to be an equilibrium is that the derivative of Π (b (z) ; x 1 ) with respect to z evaluated at x 1 is equal to zero. Note that
We denote expression (9) as FOC(z|x 1 ) . Truth telling requires that FOC(x 1 |x 1 ) = 0. Noting
is positive for all x 1 <x, we can simplify the first order condition as:
It is easier to interpret the first order condition (10) if we rewrite (10) as:
The left and the right hand sides are, respectively, bidder 1's expected benefit and expected cost if she marginally raises the announcement of her type by ∆x. To see this, note that the first term on the left hand side is the increase in the probability of bidder 1 winning the object when her opponent was previously bidding his budget and was a marginal winner; and the term in the bracket on the left hand side is the accrued surplus when winning the object in such events. The first term on the right hand side is the increase in the probability of winning the object when her opponent was previously unconstrained (hence he has a signal no more than x 1 ) and the term in the bracket is then the accrued cost of winning in such events. The optimality condition requires that the expected benefit and cost be exactly balanced when announcing the true signal.
Notice that if the bidders' valuations are private, that is, if u (S, X i , X −i ) does not depend on
. Hence the first order condition (10) can be
. In what follows we will consider the strict affiliated value case in which u (S, X i , X −i ) is strictly increasing in all of the arguments.
Existence of Equilibrium
In this section, we first obtain the properties of the "unconstrained" bidding function b (·) by examining the necessary first order condition (10), then we show the existence of solutions to (10) and finally we provide a technical condition under which (10) is also sufficient for b (·) to be part of an equilibrium.
Properties of b (·)
The first property of
. There are two ways to understand this property. The first is to examine the equation (10) and note that the term
is equal to zero when b (x) < w, which entails that (10) can be satisfied only if
Alternatively, when b (x) < w, bidder 1 knows that her marginal losing opponent is not constrained.
Hence the budget becomes irrelevant to her marginal benefit-cost trade-off in (11) , which implies that she should bid exactly the same amount as in Milgrom and Weber's (1982) second price auction with no financial constraints.
Secondly, if b (x) ≥ w and x <x, then the function b (·) must satisfy the following ordinary differential equation (ODE):
which is a re-arrangement of (10).
To summarize, bidders who place bids lower than the minimum budget shall ignore the constraints and bid the same as that prescribed by the equilibrium of with no financial constraints; bidders who place bids higher than the minimum budget shall bid according to the solution of ODE (12) . We will denote a solution to ODE (12) by b * (x) . Notice that the solution to the ODE (12) determines the domain on which the equation itself is defined :
In order for the solution to equation (12) to be monotonically increasing as postulated in (1), it must satisfy, for all x <x,
since the hazard functions λ (x) and γ (x|x) are both positive, and ν (x, x) < ϕ (x, x) for x <x in the strict affiliated value case.
Finally, since ν (x,x) = ϕ (x,x) , it must be the case that if b (·) is continuous atx, then it must satisfy:
We will refer to (14) as the boundary condition.
Existence of Monotonic Solutions to ODE (12)
Here we prove the existence of increasing solutions to ODE (12) that satisfy the boundary condition (14) , and provide a local condition on the hazard function of the budget distribution that guarantees the uniqueness of the solution.
Proposition 1 There exist solutions to ODE (12) that satisfies the monotonicity condition (13) and the boundary condition (14) . Furthermore, if γ (·) is non-increasing around a neighborhood of ν (x,x) , then the solution is unique.
Proof: (Existence.) The main difficulty to prove existence lies in the fact that in the proximity of the curve ϕ or of the pointx, Lipschitz condition is not satisfied by the ODE (12) . Moreover, the boundary condition (14) requires any solution to get arbitrarily close to ϕ when x converges tō
x. The idea of the proof is to apply the standard existence and uniqueness theorem for a compact region strictly below the ϕ, and away fromx, where Lipschitz condition holds, and then exploit the particular structure of our problem to extend the solution to the whole domain D which is given
Step 1: We first consider a subset of D uniformly bounded away from ϕ by ε > 0, and fromx by δ > 0 :
The ODE (12) 
there exists a unique flow curve starting from (x, b). Moreover, since ε is arbitrary, we can extend such a flow curve by continuity to the boundary of D (0, δ) (for the extension technique, see, e.g., Cronin 1980) . Also by taking δ to zero, we can extend the flow curves to the whole domain D.
But note that the extension does not need to satisfy the ODE (12) at the boundary of D. To summarize, we have shown that for any point in the interior of D there is a unique flow curve induced by the ODE.
Step 2: To prove existence it now suffices to show that there is a flow curve that hits (x, ϕ (x,x)).
Note that F is a closed connected set. We then define We first establish that F ν and F ϕ are both non-empty (see Figure 2 for an illustration of the two possible configurations of F ). Take any point in F that is sufficiently close to ϕ, inspecting the ODE (12) reveals that the flow curve from that point must intersect ϕ because the right hand side of the ODE can be sufficiently larger than the derivative of ϕ. Hence F ϕ is non-empty. The same argument shows that F ν is non-empty. Since D is bounded, it is immediate that F = F ν ∪ F ϕ .
Since the end-point of a curve depends in a continuous way of the starting point, the sets F ν and F ϕ are both closed sets. Because F is connected, F ν and F ϕ must have a non-empty intersection.
Since the graphs of ν and ϕ intersect only at (x, ϕ (x,x)) , we have proved that there is at least one point from which the flow curve induced by the ODE (12) satisfies the boundary condition (14) .
(Uniqueness.) We know that the flow curves do not intersect each other in the interior of D, but to rule out the possibility that the flow curves intersect at the boundary point (x, ϕ (x,x)) requires a different argument. Suppose that the solution is not unique and letb (·) andb (·) be two distinct solutions. Pick any x 0 close tox. Due to the local uniqueness in the interior, we can without loss of generality, assume thatb (x 0 ) >b (x 0 ) . But then if γ (·) is non-increasing around a neighborhood The domain on which ODE (12) is defined is then given by [x w ,x] where
In a symmetric equilibrium, the "unconstrained" bidding function b (·) in (1) will be given by:
The "unconstrained" bidding function b (·) is illustrated in Figure 3 .
The "unconstrained" bidding function (16) possesses, potentially, an interesting discontinuity feature. Note that ν (x w , x w ) ≤ w holds by the definition of x w . But there is no guarantee that ν (x w , x w ) = w. If the strict inequality ν (x w , x w ) < w holds, then there is a discontinuity in the "unconstrained" bidding function. The empirical consequence of this discontinuity is that the bids in the interval (ν (x w , x w ) , w) will be observed with probability zero. This can be related to the her opponents. However, by construction, the jump bidding in Avery's paper can only occur in the beginning of the auction. In reality, jump bids often occur in the middle of an auction. For example, Cramton (1997) found that in the FCC auction of the radio spectrum, "49% of all new high bids were jump bids ..., 23% of these jump bids were raises of one's own high bids". Even though we study SPA in this paper, the equilibrium of the SPA is also an equilibrium of an English auction when there are two bidders. We can hence interpret the gap between ν (x w , x w ) and b * (x w ) as a jump bid: as the standing bids are raised past ν (x w , x w ) , a bidder will realize that her opponent may be financially constrained, and hence she will bid more aggressively if she herself is not yet financially constrained.
Finally, two features of Proposition 1 are worth remarking. First, the existence of solutions to ODE (12) does not depend on the hazard function of the budget constraint distribution γ (·);
Second, the sufficient condition for the uniqueness is only a local condition: it requires that γ (·)
be non-increasing in a neighborhood of ν (x,x) . Because it is a local condition on γ (·), one can always slightly perturb any budget density distribution g (·) around the neighborhood of ν (x,x) into a new densityg (·) which satisfies the local non-increasing condition.
Existence of Equilibrium
Proposition 1 establishes the existence of solutions to the first order condition (10) . What remains to show that the "unconstrained" bidding function identified in (16) constitutes a symmetric equilibrium in the form of (1) is to verify that in fact the first order condition is sufficient for optimality of the problem (4).
We will show below that a sufficient condition for the first order condition to be sufficient for optimality is when FOC(z|x 1 ) as defined in (9) is strictly quasi-monotone (SQM) in x 1 (see also
Lizzeri and Persico 2000)
.
In words, a function H (y) is SQM in y if it crosses zero at most once from below. To guarantee that FOC(z|x 1 ) is quasi-monotone in x 1 , we only need to ensure that the term in the bracket of (9), namely
is SQM in x 1 because, for all z ∈ (x,x) , the term
and SQM is preserved under positive multiplication. 1 The second term in (17) is strictly increasing in x 1 due to strict affiliated value assumption and the fact that b 0 (·) ≥ 0. However, the first term in (17) is not necessarily increasing in x 1 due to two competing forces: on the one hand, ν (x 1 , z) is increasing in x 1 due to affiliation; on the other hand, the affiliation between X 1 and X 2 also implies that the hazard function λ (z|x 1 ) is non-increasing in x 1 . 2 Therefore we need to make the following sufficient assumption for FOC(z|x 1 ) to be strictly quasi-monotone in x 1 .
This assumption is identical to that for Theorem 1 of Krishna and Morgan (1997) in their analysis of war-of-attrition. It requires that the affiliation between X 1 and X 2 is not so strong that it overwhelms the increase in the expected value of the object, ν (·, z) , resulting from a higher signal x 1 . It is clear that Assumption 8 ensures that FOC(z|x 1 ) is SQM in x 1 for all z ∈ (x,x).
1 Note that SQM is weaker than strict monotonicity, moreover, strict monotonocity is not necessarily preserved by positive multiplication. 2 To see this, let x 0 > x, z 0 > z, affiliation implies that
Integrating over z 0 ∈ (z, +∞) yields
, then the first order condition (9) is sufficient for optimality.
Proof: Consider the auction as a revelation mechanism. If an unconstrained bidder 1 of type x 1 reports a type y such that y < x 1 , then the first order derivative of her objective with respect to her report, FOC(y|x 1 ) will be strictly positive because, if x 1 > y, SQM implies that FOC(y|x 1 ) > 0 since FOC(y|y) = 0. Similarly if she reports y > x 1 , then FOC(y|x 1 ) < 0 since FOC(y|y) = 0. Hence
is single peaked at x 1 for every x 1 ∈ (x w ,x) .Q.E.D.
Using Lemma 1, we can now prove the main result of this paper: response is again truth-telling: by reporting that her type is (w, x) , the mediator will submit for her a bid min {w, b (x)} = w for her.
However, the first order condition (9) does not uniquely determine the best response of an unconstrained bidder 1 if she receives a signal x 1 ∈ {x w ,x}. In fact, a bidder of type x w is indifferent in placing any bid in the interval [ν (x w , x w ) , w] because the probability that her opponent also bids in this interval is zero, which, under the rules of the SPA, implies that neither her probability of winning nor her expected payment depends on how much she bids in this interval. Conversely, her opponent's best response will not be affected when bidder 1 of type x w changes her bids since she is of measure zero. Analogously, the expected surplus of an unconstrained bidder of typex is constant for any bid above ν (x,x) . To see this, note that, by bidding more than ν (x,x, ) , a typex bidder still wins the object with probability 1 and pays the opponent's bid. Conversley, her opponent's best response is not affected because the distribution of bids are not changed when a typex bidder changes her bids. Q.E.D.
We now relate our results to the existing literature. As we discussed earlier, when the bidders' valuations are private, then ν (x, x) = ϕ (x, x) and the first order condition (10) is satisfied only by b (x) = ν (x, x), confirming Che and Gale's (1998) results. When the bidders have strictly affiliated values, we have ν (x, x) < ϕ (x, x) , hence the "unconstrained" bid b (x) is higher than ν (x, x) for all
x > x w . The intuition is simple: the presence of financial constraints attenuates the winner's curse.
A buyer may win the object even if her competitors have higher signals, thus it is no longer true that the winner is the buyer who most overestimated the value of object. Consequently, unconstrained bidders bid more aggressively.
A Linear Example
Here we present a simple linear example to illustrate that unconstrained bidders will bid more aggressively when it is possible that her opponents face financial constraints. For i = 1, 2, let X i be bidder i's signal, and let the common value of the object be V = X 1 + X 2 . Suppose X 1 and X 2 are independent and uniformly distributed on [0, s] where s > 0. Let W i be bidder i's budget and suppose that W 1 and W 2 are independent and uniformly distributed on [0, 2s] . The following can be verified for this example:
Plugging these expressions into (12) we obtain
together with the boundary condition that b (s) = ν (s, s) = ϕ (s, s) = 2s, we obtain the unique solution:
The three curves, ν (x, x) , ϕ (x, x) and b (x) are plotted in Figure 4 for s = 10.
Comparative Statics
In this section, we provide the comparative statics results of the equilibrium "unconstrained"
bidding function with respect to public signals and the severity of the financial constraints. 
Equilibrium with Public Signals
Suppose that, prior to the bidding, both bidders publicly observed a signal X 0 , which is a component of S. For notational ease, however, we write X 0 separately from S. The signal X 0 could be, for example, a signal publicly revealed by the seller. Bidders now can condition their bids both on their private signals and the public signal x 0 . We will write b (x; x 0 ) as the "unconstrained"
bid of a bidder with private signal x and public signal x 0 . It is important to note that since x 0 is publicly observed, we can essentially treat x 0 as a parameter of the model. Analogous to the case without public signals, the "unconstrained" bidding function b (·; x 0 ) must satisfy the following
where
Under analogous conditions to those in Theorem 1, we can prove the existence of a symmetric equilibrium. The proof is omitted. The following proposition shows how the public signal affects the "unconstrained" bidding function b (·) .
Proposition 2
If the bidders have strictly affiliated values, then the "unconstrained" bidding function b (x; x 0 ) is increasing in the public signal x 0 for all x ∈ (x,x) .
Proof: Let x l 0 < x h 0 be two public signals. The boundary condition requires that b
for all x ∈ (x,x) . Suppose not. Then the boundary condition implies that there exists somex ∈ (x,x) , b ¡x ; Proposition 2 is not a surprising result: the release of good news will intuitively make the unconstrained bidders to bid more aggressively. The proof, however, is less trivial because we lack an explicit solution to the differential equation (18).
The Severity of the Financial Constraints
Consider a parametric family of financial constraint distributions G (·; θ) with g (·; θ) being the corresponding PDF. The parametric family of hazard function of the budget function, denoted by γ (w; θ) , is denoted by
Suppose that the parametric family of hazard functions satisfy the increasing hazard rate condition (IHR): if θ 1 > θ 2 , then γ (w; θ 1 ) > γ (w; θ 2 ) for all w. 3 It can be shown that IHR implies first order stochastic dominance: if θ 1 > θ 2 then G (w; θ 2 ) ≤ G (w; θ 1 ) for all w. In other words, when the value of θ is higher, it is more likely that one's opponent is financially constrained. This means that an unconstrained bidder is more likely to win the object because of his/her opponent having a lower budget instead of having a lower signal. This attenuates the winner's curse, and makes the "unconstrained" bidders bid more aggressively. Let b * (·; θ) denote the solution to the ODE (12) when G (·; θ) is the CDF of the budget constraints.
Proposition 3 Suppose that IHR holds and that the bidders have strictly affiliated values. Then
Proof: Suppose to the contrary. Then either b * (x; θ 1 ) = b * (x; θ 2 ) for somex <x; or b * (x; θ 2 ) > b * (x; θ 1 ) for all x <x and b * (x; θ 1 ) = b * (x; θ 2 ) . We now show that neither is consistent with equilibrium.
Case I. If b * (x; θ 1 ) = b * (x; θ 2 ) for somex <x, , then inspecting the ODE (12) reveals that under the IHR condition b * 0 (x; θ 1 ) < b * 0 (x; θ 2 ) must hold. Thus if b * (·; θ 2 ) and b * (·; θ 1 ) crosses at some pointx <x, b * (·; θ 2 ) must cross b * (·; θ 1 ) from below, which implies that they can only cross once. However, the boundary condition (14) requires that b * (x; θ 1 ) = b * (x; θ 2 ) , a contradiction.
for all x <x and b * (x; θ 1 ) = b * (x; θ 2 ) , we will rule out this possibility as follows: we show that if b * (x; θ 1 ) = b * (x; θ 2 ) , then there exists a neighborhood ofx in which b * (x; θ 1 ) > b * (x; θ 2 ) . To this end, we first show the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Let b * (·) be an equilibrium "unconstrained" bidding function that satisfies the boundary condition (14) . Then the left derivative of b * (·) atx exists and is given by
where the limit of the left hand side of expression (19) is zero because, b * 0 (x n ) must be bounded if x n is close enough tox and 1 − F (x n |x n ) converges to zero. To see that b * 0 (x n ) is bounded in a neighborhood ofx, note that b * (x n ) lies between ν (x n , x n ) and ϕ (x n , x n ) , but they must meet atx, hence in a neighborhood ofx, b * 0 (x n ) must be higher than dv (x n , x n ) /dx and be lower than dϕ (x n , x n ) /dx. Therefore we have
hence,
Since the above lemma holds regardless of the distribution of the budget constraint, we know that
For anyx <x, we know from the ODE (12) that
Taking limits asx ↑x, we obtain
Since IHR implies that
we must then have
which in turn implies that b * (x; θ 1 ) > b * (x; θ 2 ) forx within a neighborhood ofx, a contradiction to b * (x; θ 2 ) > b * (x; θ 1 ) for all x <x. Q.E.D.
Discussions
In this paper, we study an affiliated value SPA with two financially constrained bidders. We seller is that 0 and 1 occur with equal probability. Bidders do not receive any private signal before they bid, while the seller will receive a signal that tells her the true value of the object. If the seller commits to a concealing policy, the bidders will both bid 1/2 for the object. If the seller commits to a revealing policy, then the bidders will both bid 0 if the true value is 0 and 3/4 if the true value is 1. Hence the seller's expected revenue under the concealing policy is 1/2, while that under the revealing policy is 3/4 × 1/2 = 3/8, which is smaller. The reason is clear: when the low value 0 is revealed, the bidders both drop their bids unfettered by the budget; but when the high value 1 is revealed, the bidders can only increase their bids up to the bidding budget.
II. Relation to Che and Gale (1998)
It is interesting to relate our equilibrium characterization to Che and Gale's (1998) characterization of the first price IPV auction with financially constrained bidders. Their Lemma 1
states that under a technical condition there exists a unique, symmetric equilibrium in the form B (w, x) = min {w, b (x)} for some continuous and strictly increasing function b (·) . 4 Recall that in our characterization, the"unconstrained" bidding function b (·) could have a jump. The reason is that, in the first price auction, if there is a jump at, say x * , such that 
III. Extensions
A few extensions are worth pursuing. First, when there are more than 2 bidders, under what conditions can we obtain a similar symmetric equilibrium? Our preliminary analysis of the general n bidder case suggests that the basic features of two-bidder case may remain, even though the analysis becomes significantly more involved. Second, it is interesting to study the English and the first price affiliated value auctions with financially constrained bidders, and study how the revenue ranking of these auction mechanisms changes due to the presence of financial constraints. Third, what is the effect of seller financing on the seller's expected revenue in the affiliated value setting?
